nav emailalert searchbtn searchbox tablepage yinyongbenwen piczone journalimg journalInfo journalinfonormal searchdiv searchzone qikanlogo popupnotification paper paperNew
2025, 02, v.42 44-53
三方演化博弈金融学视角下政府引导基金优化研究
基金项目(Foundation): 安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2023CX039); 合肥学院本科教学质量与教学改革工程项目(2023hfujyd07); 安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2022CX513)
邮箱(Email):
DOI:
摘要:

为研究政府引导基金如何通过设定契约来撬动社会资金投资,达到支持中小型科创企业发展的目标,构建了政府、风险投资机构与科创企业三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件进行数值仿真模拟。分析发现,在政府创业引导基金契约中使用多任务激励模式以及增加监督惩罚机制,能够影响风险投资机构与科创企业的策略选择,使政府创业引导基金发挥引导社会投资,促进企业创新的作用,同时也能有效解决政府引导基金中多重委托代理问题,增加风险投资机构对中小型科创企业的资金支持力度,使引导基金真正流向科创企业、促进创新。

Abstract:

In this paper, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, venture capital institutions and science and technology enterprises, and using Matlab software for numerical simulation, we study how the government guidance fund can incite social capital investment by setting contracts to achieve the goal of supporting the development of science and technology enterprises. It is found that the government guidance fund can influence the strategic choice of risk institutions and innovation strategies of science and technology enterprises by implementing multi-task incentives and regulatory penalties, so that the government entrepreneurship guidance fund can play a role in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. Risk discovery shows that the use of multi-task incentive mode and the addition of regulatory penalty clauses in the government venture guidance fund contract can effectively solve the dual principal-agent problem in the government venture guidance fund, increase the financial support of venture capital institutions for science and technology enterprises, and make the guidance fund really flow to science and technology enterprises and promote innovation.

参考文献

[1] CUMMING D. Government Policy towards Entrepreneurial Finance:Innovation Investment Funds[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2007,22(2):193-235.

[2] CHEN Z,ZHANG H,TIAN M. Study on the Guiding Effects of the Government Venture Capital Guiding Fund Based on Markowitz Mean-Variance Model[J]. DEStech Transactions on Social Science, Education and Human Science, 2017(eemt):519-523.

[3] FAZEKAS B, BECSKY-NAGY P. A New Theoretical Model of Government Backed Venture Capital Funding[J]. Acta Oeconomica,2021,71(3):487-506.

[4] SCHERTLER A, TYKVOVáT. What Lures Cross-border Venture Capital Inflows?[J]. Journal of International Money and Finance, 2012,31(6), 1777-1799.

[5]周育红,宋光辉.创业投资网络研究现状评介与未来展望[J].外国经济与管理, 2012, 34(6):17-24.

[6]左志刚,石方志,谭观钦.国有创投发挥了引导作用吗?:基于鉴证机理的实证检验[J].财经研究,2017,43(12):17-29.

[7]徐明.政府风险投资、代理问题与企业创新:来自政府引导基金介入的证据[J].南开经济研究,2022(2):51-67.

[8]曹启龙,盛昭瀚,周晶,等.公平偏好下PPP项目多任务激励问题研究[J].预测,2016,35(1):75-80.

[9]梁蔚萍,周翔翼.容错机制能激励政府引导基金发挥引导作用吗?[J].科学学研究,2024,42(1):85-97.

[10]王斌,李建平.双重道德风险下政府引导基金激励监督机制设计[J].运筹与管理,2023,32(10):122-128.

[11]周育红,王鹏宇,梁小敏.政府引导基金、创业投资与企业创新:基于演化博弈视角[J].证券市场导报,2023(6):41-53.

基本信息:

中图分类号:F832.51;F224.32

引用信息:

[1]于娜,徐晴,程蕾.三方演化博弈金融学视角下政府引导基金优化研究[J].合肥大学学报,2025,42(02):44-53.

基金信息:

安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2023CX039); 合肥学院本科教学质量与教学改革工程项目(2023hfujyd07); 安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题(2022CX513)

发布时间:

2025-04-28

出版时间:

2025-04-28

检 索 高级检索

引用

GB/T 7714-2015 格式引文
MLA格式引文
APA格式引文